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CURRENT LEGISLATION
CORPORATIONS
MASSACHUSETTS CORPORATE PROVISIONS
Over a century ago, Chief Justice Shaw said, "The State of Massachu-
setts is eminently a community of corporations."/ In an attempt to preserve
the state as a "community of corporations" the Massachusetts legislature
enacted a new business corporations statute, Chapter 156B,2 which con-
solidates, revises, and replaces the present business corporations statutes. 8
The drafting committee on corporate law of the Boston Bar Association,
in drawing up the new statute used the ABA-ALI Model Business Corpora-
tion Statute (hereafter cited as the Model Act) as a guide. 4
The general purpose of the Model Business Corporation Act is to pro-
vide a statute on general business corporations which might be of assistance
and use to any state which desires to rewrite and modernize its basic
corporation laws. The act was not designed for adoption in its entirety.
"It was realized that there would be, in every state, local preference, and
traditions, or constitutional provisions, which would dictate departures."
Generally, the Model Act attempts to preserve in proper balance the in-
terests of the public, corporations, shareholders, and management. Jurisdic-
tions adhering to the Model Act with more or less minor variations include
Wisconsin, Oregon, District of Columbia, Texas, Virginia, North Dakota,
Alaska, Colorado, and Iowa. Similar to the Model Act in many respects
are the statutes in Maryland, Illinois, Puerto Rico, and Alabama. 8
The purpose here is to survey some of the highlights of the new Massa-
chusetts business corporations statute (hereafter referred to as new act)
and to attempt to point out the reasons for the adopted alterations. More
specifically, attention will be focused upon alterations in substantive rights
and powers. In addition, some comparative reference will be made to the
Model Act.
While shareholders are the owners of a corporation, the general powers
of management do not reside in them, but in the board of directors. The
shareholders' most important control over management lies in the election
of directors, and shareholders can best influence management policy by
electing directors with similar predilections. Co-ordinate with this power
of election is the removal of directors. The present corporation statute,
chapter 156, section 22 of the Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., makes provisions
for the election of directors and officers by shareholders but makes no
provision for the removal of directors and officers by shareholders. Ap-
1 Godard v. Smithett, 69 Mass. (3 Gray) 116, 117 (1854).
2 Mass. Acts 1964, ch. 723 §§ 1-114 (effective October 1, 1965).
a Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 155, §§ 1-56; ch. 156, §§ 1-55 (1958).
4 ABA-ALI Model Bus. Corp. Act §§ 1-145 (1960).
5 Campbell, The Model Business Corporation Act, 11 Bus. Law 98 (1956).
a See Brown, A Consideration of the Nebraska Corporation Law in the Light of
the American Bar Association's Model Business Corporations Act, 39 Neb. L. Rev.
575, 577, n.10 (1960).
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proximately one-half of the states have no statutory provision for the re-
moval of directors? It is generally stated that shareholders have inherent
authority to remove directors from office, if cause can be shown.° Such
authority is necessary since, otherwise, a director who is guilty of con-
tinuing violations of his duty could remain in office.
There is no implied power in the shareholders to remove the directors
without cause before the expiration of their term.° As a result, the share-
holders, although the owners of the corporation, must acquiesce in the policies
of the directors in control, even though these policies do not represent
majority shareholder opinion. The new act provides that directors and
officers elected by stockholders may be removed with or without cause by
a majority vote of shareholders entitled to vote 1 0 Since Massachusetts
allows the division of directors into classes," chapter 156B, section 51
provides that directors elected by a particular class of shareholders may be
removed only by the majority vote of that class. The Model Act permits
removal of directors with or without cause by the stockholders."
It would appear that the new "removal" provision will be an im-
portant safeguard and means of control for the majority shareholders. If
directors have a right to continue in office until the completion of their
term, in spite of a change in controlling shareholders, those who acquire
control will have to wait until the annual meeting or else convince the
present directors to resign and put in office a new board of directors repre-
senting their views of policy. A majority of shareholders will now be able
to remove directors, without waiting until the next annual meeting, and
appoint new directors to carry out their business policy. It would appear
that as a matter of corporation law the new "removal" provision in effect
transfers directorial control from fiduciary directors to the majority stock-
holders and results in a partnership type control.
In addition, chapter 156B, section 51 provides that officers appointed
by the directors may be removed with or without cause by a majority vote
of the directors then in office. The present corporation act of Massachusetts
makes no provision for such officer removal. Generally, most jurisdictions
hold that directors have the power to elect or appoint officers and have the
power to remove officers with or without cause." The object of this new
provision is apparently to give the fullest control and responsibility to the
directors in managing corporate affairs. If an officer under an employment
contract may be removed without cause, then his removal may be a breach
7 See generally I CCH Corp: Law Guide § 668.
E.g., Norman v. Roosevelt Democratic Club, 17 Misc. 2d 219, 220, 184 N.Y.S.2d
980 (1959). Auer v. Dressel, 306 N.Y. 427, 432, 118 N.E.2d 590, 593 (1954). 2
Fletcher's Cyclopedia Corporations § 356 (perm. ed. 1954).
9 Abberger v. Kulp, 156 Misc. 210, 212, 281 N.Y. Supp. 373, 376 (1935). Bal-
lantine Corporations § 185, at 434 (Rev. ed. 1946).
le" Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 156B, § 51 (Supp. 1964).
11 Old statute—Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 156, § 22 (1958). New statute—Mass.
Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 156B, § 50 (Supp. 1964).
12 ABA-ALI Model Bus. Corp. Act § 36A (1960) (optional section).
12 See, e.g., Casson v. Bossman, 137 N.J. Eq. 532, 45 A.2d 807 (1946) ; Cuppy v.
Stallwerck Bros., 216 N.Y. 591, 111 N.E. 249 (1916).
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of contract, rendering the corporation liable in damages." If a valid em-
ployment contract exists between the corporation and officer, then the
board may be said to have the power but not the right to remove and
the corporation will be liable for damages. This is the view adopted by
the Model Act." ,
Section 51 of the new act also provides that "directors and officers
elected by shareholders may be removed for cause by a majority vote of
the directors then in office!'" This is a completely new provision to Massa-
chusetts corporate law. Generally, the board of directors has no power to
remove a fellow director for cause, even though it believes him hostile to
the corporation, as the director is chosen by the shareholders." The Model
Act contains no provision for the removal of directors by fellow directors.
The new act requires that a minority shareholder who seeks to insti-
tute a derivative suit must have been a shareholder at the time of the act
complained of, or have obtained his stock by operation of law from one
who was a stockholder at such time." This is generally referred to as the
"contemporaneous ownership requirement" and is perhaps the most im-
portant qualification placed upon a plaintiff—shareholder in a derivative
suit." The prior Massachusetts corporation statute was silent on this point.
Case Iaw explicitly eliminated such a requirement. 20 In substance, the corpo-
ration is the plaintiff, and the shareholder merely sets the judicial machinery
in motion to enforce a corporate cause of action. Any recovery inures to
the benefit of the corporation.2 ' On the other hand, a direct suit (suit in
his own right) involves the enforcement by a shareholder of a cause of
action against directors or majority shareholders for wrongful acts which
result in direct injury to the shareholder. 22
Derivative suits are a very valuable remedy as a means of holding
wrongdoers to account, but the remedy itself is subject to abuse when
14 Cf. Buswell Trimmer Co. v. Coburn, 188 Mass. 254, 74 N.E. .334 (1905).
ABA-AL1 Model Bus. Corp.'. Act § 45 (1960) ; Accord, United Producers and
Consumers Co-op v. Held, 225 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1955).
10
 Directors, treasurers and clerks are elected by shareholders. Mass. Gen. Laws
Ann. ch. 156B, § 48 (Supp. 1964).
17 See Bruch v. Nat'l Guar. Credit Corp., 13 Del. Ch. 180, 116 Atl. 738, 741
(1922). (Only the appointing authority has removal authority.) Compare Frank v.
Anthony, 107 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 1958); Brindley v. Walker, 221 Pa. 287, 70 Atl. 794
(1908).
18
 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 156B, § 46 (Supp. 1964).
1° Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Kentucky, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Washington, the District of Columbia
and Puerto Rico provide that in a shareholder derivative action the plaintiff must have
owned his shares at the time of the transaction complained of or have acquired them
by operation of law. ABA-ALI Model Bus. Corp. Act § 43A, comment 2.202(1)
(1960).
20 Peterson v. Hopson, 306 Mass. 597, 611-12, 29 N.E.2d 140, 149 (1940) held that:
It is no objection to the hill that the plaintiff is not alleged to have been
the owner of preferred stock at the time of the alleged wrongdoing. . . .
flit is immaterial whether the stockholder who seeks to vindicate the right
of the corporation was such at the time of the wrongdoing or not.
21 See generally Ballantine, Corporations § 143 (Rev. ed. 1946).
22 See, e.g., Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947) ; Lebold v.
Inland Steel Co., 125 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1941).
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brought by small shareholders primarily to enrich themselves. The purpose
of the "contemporaneous ownership requirement" is to prevent the buying
of nuisance or strike suits. 23 A strike suit has been defined as "an action
brought purely for its nuisance value, with the purpose of obtaining a
settlement for the complainant's sole benefit—the amount of the proposed
settlement being far greater than any possible injury suffered by the com-
plainant."24 Nuisance suits, strike suits, and other abuses of the derivative
remedy have led to various restrictions being placed upon it. 25 It would
appear- that Massachusetts adopted this provision to prevent a subsequent
purchaser of shares from speculating in a purchased cause of action.
As a general rule, if a minority shareholder satisfies the "contempo-
raneous ownership requirement," a court will not consider his wrongful
motives unless he is suing solely in the interests of an adverse company,
in which case the action will be dismissed 2 6 Therefore, it would seem that
no adequate rule has been enacted to prevent a shareholder who satisfies
the "contemporaneous ownership requirement" from bringing a strike
suit.27
The "contemporaneous ownership" provision is indicative of an at-
tempt by Massachusetts to get in line with modern corporate law by striking
a balance between the need for derivative suits and the abuses to which such
suits are subject.
The appraisal remedy of a dissenting shareholder has been substan-
tively and procedurally revised. The appraisal remedy is one which permits
dissenting minority shareholders to demand that the corporation purchase
the shareholder's stock. The purpose of such a provision is to grant dis-
senters a simple and efficient means of withdrawing from the corporation in
case of fundamental changes."
23 See generally, ABA-ALI Model Bus. Corp. Act 43A, comment (1960).
24 Ballantine, Corporations § 149, at 354-56 (Rev. ed. 1946).
25 The original rule was set out in Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881). The
complaint in a shareholder's derivative suit must allege besides his efforts to obtain
redress from the directors and shareholders that the plaintiff was a shareholder at the
time of the transaction complained of, or that his shares came to him since then by
operation of law, and that the action is not one to get the case into a federal court
on the ground of diversity of citizenship. This rule later became Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) prohibits dismissal or compromise without court approval, with
such notice to other shareholders as the court may direct.
26 See, e.g., Quirke v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 277 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1960) ;
Ballantine, Corporations § 149, at 354-56 (Rev. ed. 1946).
27 The ABA Model Act which was a pattern for the new Massachusetts business
corporation statute contains a "contemporaneous ownership requirement." In addition,
the ABA Model Act contains a provision whereby the court in a shareholder derivative
action, found to have been brought without reasonable cause, may require the plaintiff
to pay the defendants the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred in
the defense of the action; and a security for expenses provision (the holder or holders
of less than 5% of the outstanding shares of a class, unlesS the market value of such
shares is $25,000, shall be required to give security for expenses). ABA-ALI Model
Bus. Corp. Act § 43A (1960) (optional section). Such a rule would seem to be a
strong deterrent to a "contemporaneous shareholder" who lacks reasonable grounds,
from bringing a strike suit.
28 See generally, Looney, Dissenting Minority Stockholder's Right of Appraisal,
4 B.C. Ind. & • Corn. L. Rev. 85 (1962) ; Moynihan, Dissenting Stockholder's Remedy
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Massachusetts early enacted such an "appraisal statute" which met
with the favor of other legislatures to such an extent that' it was , adopted
either verbatim or in substance in nine other states. 29 The old appraisal
statute permits a right of demand and payment upon a sale, lease or ex-
change of all or substantially all the corporation's property and assets, or
for a change in the nature of its business," or if the corporation has voted
to merge or consolidate." The new act eliminates the appraisal remedy for
a change in the nature of the corporation's business, retains the remedy
if the corporation has voted to sell, lease or exchange all or substantially
all its assets," or if the corporation has voted to merge or consolidate"
and extends the remedy for any amendment of the articles of organization
which adversely affects the rights of the stockholders."
Under the old act, chapter 156, sections 41, 41A, 41B, and 41C con-
trol transactions relating to stock provided that no amendment impairing or
diminishing the preferences, voting powers, restrictions and qualifications of
any class of stock may be passed without the consent of the holders of such
stock. For example, under the old act if a majority votes to abolish prefer-
ences, and a minority does not consent to such a change, the minority may
retain its preferences, although the majority has eliminated its own pref-
erences." In such a situation there would be no right of appraisal, and it
would appear that the minority has, for all practical purposes, a veto power
over a proposed amendment which would "impair or diminish the preferences,
voting powers, restrictions or qualifications of the stock held by him."
Applying the new act, in the example given above, if a majority elimi-
nated preferences, the minority would have to resort to the appraisal remedy.
The new provision affords every dissenting minority shareholder "adversely
affected" the protection afforded by the appraisal remedy" and eliminates
the minority shareholder's virtual veto power by permitting changes of
the stock provisions of the articles of organization which "adversely affect
shareholder rights" by a two-thirds vote."
The Model Act permits the appraisal remedy in case of merger or
upon Consolidation, 7 Ann. Survey of Mass. Law 56 (1960) ; Comment, 72 Harv. L.
Rev. 1132 (1959).
28 Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Minnesota, New Hampshire,
Vermont, Wyoming. See Kaplan, Problems in the Acquisition of Shares of Dissenting
Minorities, 34 B.U.L. Rev. 291, 292 (1954).
3° Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 156, § 46 (1958).
31 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 156, § 46E ( 1958).
32
 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 156B, § 76 (Supp. 1964).
83
 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 156B, § 85 (Supp. 1964).
34
 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 156B, § 77 (Supp. 1964).
35 See James v. Washburn Co., 326 Mass. 356, 94 N.E.Id 479 (1950). It was held
that, although a recapitalization plan authorized cancellation of all preferred and com-
mon stock, and substitution of capital stock thereof was adopted by vote of more than
two-thirds of each class of stock outstanding, a dissenting preferred stockholder had the
right to retain liquidation dividend, voting and other preferences attached to her
stock. The corporation could not cancel all existing preferred and common shares in
existence at the time and could not take away preferences of such stock without
consent of the individual shareholder.
36
 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 156B, §§ 76, 77 (Supp. 1964).
37 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 156B, § 74 (Supp. 1964).
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consolidation, or upon any sale or exchange of all or substantially all
of the assets of the corporation, not made in the regular course of its
business.39 The Model Act provides no appraisal right as a result of the
lease, mortgage or pledge (as distinguished from a sale or exchange) of all,
or substantially all, of the corporate assets, or in the case of amendment of
the articles of organization. Both Massachusetts and the Model Act do
not allow the appraisal remedy in case of a merger of a parent corpora-
tion with a wholly owned subsidiary 9 9 It would appear that in such a
merger the change is formal only, the shareholder's essential position is un-
changed, and there is no logical reason for granting appraisal rights.
Under the old act, in order to perfect his appraisal rights, the share-
holder must have voted against the action taken, and within thirty days of
the vote made a written demand that the corporation purchase his stock.
If the corporation and shareholder cannot agree upon the value of the
stock, then such value will be determined by three disinterested appraisers,
one each appointed by the shareholder and corporation and the third
chosen by both. The finding of the appraisers is final and if the corporation
does not pay in thirty days, the shareholder may sue in contract for the
appraised value."'
The procedure of the new act is as follows: in order to preserve rights,
the shareholder must file a written objection with the corporation before the
proposed vote and must not have voted in favor of the proposed action.
Within ten days of the effective date of the voted matter, the corporation
must notify each stockholder (who has made a demand and not voted in
favor) by registered mail that the action approved at the meeting has be-
come effective. If the shareholder makes a demand within twenty days, then
the corporation must pay him the fair value of his stock within thirty
days of receiving notice. If they fail to agree on the fair value during the
thirty days, then within four months either may . bring a bill in equity in
superior court in the county where the corporation has its principal office
in this state, demanding a determination of value. Any bill filed must state
the names of all the stockholders who have demanded payment and with
whom the corporation has not reached agreement; thus it will be a con-
solidated proceeding. Notice of the proceeding shall be given to all such
stockholders. After a hearing, the court shall determine value and in addi-
tion may impose costs, exclusive of fees of counsel or other appraisal
experts, including the reasonable compensation of any master appointed
by the court and interest shall be granted from the date of the award. 41
The appraisal procedure of the new act is more lengthy and complex
than under the prior act, but it would appear that such considerations are
overridden by the exactitude and fairness of the provisions. The procedure
of the old act created more problems than it solved. There were no pro-
88 ABA-ALI Model Bus. Corp. Act § 73 (1960).
39 ABA-ALI Model Bus. Corp. Act § 73 (1960) ; Mass. Gen, Laws ch. 156B, § 85
(Supp. 1964).
49 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 156, § 46 (1958).
41 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 156B, §§ 87-98 (Supp. 1964).
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cedures for resolving appraiser conflicts42 or for determining costs," and
there was no provision for consolidating appraisal hearings. It would appear
that if more than one shareholder sought to enforce appraisal rights, there
would be a necessity for multi-appraisal proceedings, and there was the
possibility that the value determined in each case would be different because
the choice of the appraiser was left to the parties. Neither statute provides
a basis for the determination of "fair value" and it would appear that
such must ultimately depend upon the circumstances of each case."
The new act provides that the appraisal remedy is the dissenting share-
holders' exclusive remedy, except that it does not preclude the shareholder
from bringing an action for fraud or illegality." It would appear that "exclu-
sive" indicates that the shareholder will be prevented from enjoining corporate
action on grounds of unfairness or harshness." It is submitted that the
elimination of suits for unfairness or harshness would protect the corpora-
tion from defending against vexatious suits by the minority who disagree
with policy changes. Since majority vote controls, common sense would
require that minority shareholders absent fraud or illegality should not be
permitted to prevent organizational changes. The old act and the Model Act
are silent on this point.
It would appear that many legal headaches will be avoided by the new
act which slightly varies the Model Act appraisal remedy.° The Model
Act not only requires the corporation to send a written notice after approval
of the action, but requires it to Make an offer of settlement and to enclose
a balance sheet and a profit or loss statement. It would appear that such
additional financial information is for the shareholder's benefit in determining
the value of his shares.
The new business corporations act, in addition to substantive changes,
contains many new provisions which, when taken as a whole, evidence a
desire to modernize, and to liberalize procedural requirements so as to
provide more flexibility in corporate operations." For example, chapter
156B, section 9 of the new act enlarges the statutory powers possessed by
a corporation. Under the new act the mere act of incorporation, no matter
42
 For a discussion of appraiser difficulties which may arise under the statute, see
Kaplan, supra note 29.
43
 For a discussion of the problem of the allocation of expenses of appraisal, see
Comment, 60 Yale L.J. 337 (1951).
44 For a discussion of problems of valuation, see Moynihan, supra note 28.
45 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 156B, § 98 (Supp. 1964). In Cole v. Wells, 224 Mass,
504, 113 N.E. 189 (1916), it was held that the appraisal remedy is not exclusive but
is an alternative if the shareholder is able to prove fraud or deceit.
46 See generally, Note, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 538, 545-51 (1956). "Fairness" is con-
sidered in the context of specific 'charter amendments, recognizing that the cumulative
effect of all proposed changes is relevant.
47 ABA-ALI Model Bus. Corp. Act § 74 (1960).
48 The new act requires that only the articles of organization be filed. Mass. Gen.
Laws Ann. ch. 156B, § 12 (Supp. 1964). The old act requires the articles of organiza-
tion and agreement of association be filed before a certificate of incorporation will
be issued. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 156, § 11 (1958). The agreement of association
has been eliminated in the new act. Such simplification avoids formalities and lessens
paper work and filing requirements.
232
CURRENT LEGISLATION
what the purpose of the corporation may be, automatically confers upon
the corporation powers which might or might not be otherwise implied as
a necessary power in furtherance of the corporate purpose. 49 Such a change
will save paper work by making it unnecessary for lawyers to insert in the
corporation papers the long standard forms of broad general powers. In
addition, corporate flexibility is extended by chapter 156B, section 35 of
the new act which permits shareholder meetings to be held beyond the
territorial bounds of the state. 9°
Massachusetts in its new legislation has attempted to provide a more
concise organization of the law relating to corporations. Its provisions are
arranged in a more orderly manner facilitating locations of desired sections
and interpretation. Procedurally, there have been adopted changes which
consolidate unnecessary filing which has overburdened our department of
corporations and have only hampered corporate filing requirements. Sub-
stantively, Massachusetts has fallen in line with the more modern corporate
jurisdictions and is making its corporation laws attractive to possible in-
corporators so as to preserve Massachusetts as a "community of corpora-
tions."
ROBERT H. MINASIAN
49 In the old act, the "powers sections" list only a few of the statutory powers
needed by'a corporation. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 155, § 5, ch. 156, § 4 (1958). The
inclusion of a comprehensive listing of the corporate powers will eliminate confusion
and ambiguities involved in determining proper lines of corporate activity.
5° The new act, in accordance with this idea of flexibility, provides that the direc-
tors may act without a meeting if they unanimously assent in writing. Mass. Gen.
Laws Ann. ch. 156B, § 59 (Supp. 1964). Under this provision, the directors are em-
powered to decide on corporate matters without waiting for a regular meeting or
calling a special meeting.
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